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ABSTRACT 
 
The British are a Eurosceptical nation as the Brexit referendum showed. This thesis offers 
an overview of some of the concepts of Euroscepticism and brings out the factors that 
constitute the British form of Euroscepticism. These are later used as backgrounds for 
conducting a discourse analysis on the speeches of three British prime ministers - 
Thatcher, Cameron and May, to offer a conceptual map of 30 years of Euroscepticism in 
Britain. The thesis looks for changes in the prime ministers’ approaches to the UK-EU 
relationship to see how the Euroscepticism in Britain has evolved. The thesis concludes 
that the Euroscepticism in the British prime ministers’ narratives has changed both in 
general towards a harder approach, and in how the elements of British Euroscepticism are 
used in the prime ministers’ viewpoints on the UK-EU relationship. It is also reasoned 
that the evolvement of British Euroscepticism was a factor in the British saying ‘yes’ to 
Brexit. Further research could be made to look for new elements of British Euroscepti-
cism not used in the thesis or to deepen the research by including multiple speeches from 
prime ministers or by constituting a continuous timeline of speeches of all British prime 
ministers from Thatcher onwards into the analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The basis for conducting the research is the idea that there exists a British Euroscepticism 
and the level of it could change with every new government and/or with every new prime 
minister. The British case of Euroscepticism is relevant and worth studying, because no 
other country in the European Union has held referenda pertaining to continuous mem-
bership of the EU, which shows a higher level of Euroscepticism by the British people 
and which is why the topic was chosen. The research is not only relevant, but also timely 
in the light of the Brexit referendum amongst British people about staying or leaving the 
EU in the sense that – has the level of Euroscepticism consistently evolved to the point 
where the referendum was needed or had the idea of conducting one come lately. The 
new referendum was promised by Cameron in 2013 (Cameron, 2013) and was carried out 
on 23.06.2016. Euroscepticism itself is a widely discussed topic, with UK being the key 
example of it, but academic works, where discourse comparisons of British prime min-
sters’- Thatcher’s, Cameron’s and May’s - approaches to the EU would have been stud-
ied, have not yet been made.   
 
The overall aim of the thesis is to give a conceptual map of British Euroscepticism over 
the last 30 years. In a narrower approach, the thesis looks to prove that the elements of 
British Euroscepticism, which are discussed in theory, are also prevalent in the ap-
proaches of the British prime ministers as the representatives of the British people. Based 
on the previous, the thesis will then look for an answer to the question of how has the 
British Euroscepticism evolved. More specifically, it considers the question if, in the case 
of evolvement, the different approaches factored in leading the Brits to saying ‘yes’ to 
Brexit. Building upon Usherwood’s (2004) work, where Thatcher’s approach is consid-
ered to be a key building block of Eurosceptical Britain (Ibid, 5), and the occurrence of 
the eventual Brexit referendum in 2016, the hypothesis of the thesis follows that the Eu-
roscepticism in Britain has constantly evolved towards being ‘harder’ (Szczerbiak and 
Taggart, 2008, 247-248). 
 
In order to achieve the goals set out before and to answer the research questions, there are 
several assignments to be fulfilled: 1) to build a framework for general Euroscepticism 
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and British Euroscepticism based on theoretical works; 2) conduct a discourse analysis 
of selected prime ministers’ selected speeches to see how many and what kind of British 
Eurosceptical elements could be detected in them; 3) to link findings of the analysis to 
the theoretical framework to see which kind of approach of general Euroscepticism was 
used at different times; 4) to compare the findings of the previous two points to see if and 
how did the Euroscepticism in Britain change; and 5) to compare pre- and post-Brexit 
approaches to Euroscepticism to see whether the evolvement of Euroscepticism occurred 
and factored in leading to the Brits saying ‘yes’ to Brexit. 
 
Following the order of the assignments, the thesis is divided into two chapters, the first 
of which contains the theory about and the framework of Euroscepticism in general. This 
is followed by a description of more specific elements, which constitute the British form 
of Euroscepticism. The aim of the first chapter is to give an overview of the theoretical 
efforts made in the field of general Euroscepticism and British Euroscepticism, and to 
create a framework for the analytical part of the thesis. The second chapter focuses on the 
analysis of the empirical materials and the discussion on outcomes, but also involves de-
scriptions of the methodology used in the analysis and an overview of the empirical ma-
terials. The goal of the second chapter is to conduct the analysis part of the thesis based 
on the theoretical framework, answer research questions and prove or disprove the hy-
pothesis.  
 
The understanding of Euroscepticism is largely based on the works of Szczerbiak and 
Taggart (2000; 2003; 2008; Taggart, 1998; 2013; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002), who 
offer a productive distinction (Gifford, 2014, 2) between hard and soft Euroscepticism. 
This distinction in a somewhat different form is also offered by Van Klingeren, Boom-
gaarden and De Vreese (2013) and used in the analysis part of the thesis. Other typologies 
of Euroscepticism (e.g. Kopecký and Mudde, 2002) are also considered, but not used in 
the analysis following the criticism of Szczerbiak and Taggart (2003, 10-11). The frame-
work of the different elements of British Euroscepticism is derived from the works of 
Spiering (2004; 2015), Corner (2007), Daddow (2013; 2015) and Grant (2008), which are 
explained more in depth by using additional information by other authors (e.g. Bevir, 
Daddow and Schnapper, 2015).  
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The analysis of the thesis is conducted by using discourse analysis as the thesis is written 
as a qualitative research paper and as the research is carried out based on speeches. Dis-
course analysis enables to look for meanings behind the words and see the speeches in a 
specific context (Titscher et al., 2000, 25-27). Therefore it offers an opportunity to give a 
framework to each approach of the prime ministers under analysis. Thatcher’s speech 
(1988) was chosen to be analysed because it has been considered as a building block of 
British Euroscepticism (Usherwood, 2004, 5). Cameron’s narrative to British Euroscep-
ticism was taken into the analysis because Cameron (2013) brought the topic of British 
Euroscepticism (back) into the limelight as he was the prime minister who called for the 
Brexit referendum and in doing so discussed the UK-EU relationship in depth (Cameron, 
2013; 2015). May’s approach to British Euroscepticism was chosen to be considered in 
the thesis because of May being the post-Brexit prime minister of the UK and therefore 
having to conceptualize a future relationship between the UK and EU, which was done 
in the ‘Global Britain’ speech (2017). 
 
The empirical data that the thesis is built upon is transcriptions of prime ministers’ 
speeches which are derived from various sources on the Internet. The transcription of 
Thatcher’s (1988) Bruges speech is taken from Margaret Thatcher Foundation’s website, 
where historical documents of the Thatcher period are found (Home page, 2016) and 
could therefore be considered as a trustworthy source. Cameron’s speeches (2013; 2015) 
are available at the official webpage of the British government (Home page, 2017a), 
which is considered here as a trustworthy channel. The transcription of May’s (2017) 
speech is derived from the website of the news outlet The Independent (Home page, 
2017b). Although the trustworthiness of a news outlet in transcribing and forwarding a 
speech could be doubted, there is a video of Theresa May’s (2017) speech offered at the 
beginning of the transcription, which alleviates the problem of the source not being trust-
worthy enough. No additional data analysis program is used in the thesis as the number 
of empirical samples is small. 
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1. CONCEPTUALIZING EUROSCEPITICSIM 
 
1.1 Defining Euroscepticism 
 
When writing about Euroscepticism, one should understand first, what the term means. 
As it is argued that Euroscepticism depends on the context it is used in (e.g. Leconte, 
2010) and as it has become a “generic, catch-all term” (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2003, 6) 
to capture various negative attitudes towards European integration and the European Un-
ion (EU), it would be perhaps reasonable to start with explaining the origin of the word.   
 
As Leconte (2010, 3) notes, for the first decades of European integration, the people who 
opposed the integration were called, among other terms, nationalists, ‘anti-marketeers’ or 
Gaullists, as the terms Euroscepticism or Eurosceptic were not in use. Euroscepticism 
first entered the journalistic lexicon in the 1980s, the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) 
citing an article in The Times, from June of 1986, noting its first usage (Harmsen and 
Spiering, 2004, 15), but as Spiering (2004, 127) points out, it had been used earlier in the 
same paper in an article from November of 1985, although it was then interchangeably 
used with the term ‘anti-marketeer’. Following this, it is quite complicated to pinpoint the 
term’s meaning, as it morphed relatively recently from journalese into an area of political 
science and academic research (Gifford, 2014, 2; Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2003, 6). As a 
consequence, it is recognized, that borrowing and adapting the term in order to research 
or analyse attitudes towards European integration, some conceptual difficulties may arise 
(Szczerbiak and Taggart 2003, 6). Harmsen and Spiering (2004, 18) similarly state, that 
the growing scholarly literature on Euroscepticism has been considerably focused on de-
fining the term in order to understand it better and delimit the phenomenon.   
 
Some insight for narrowing down the focus of the term might be given by breaking the 
word down into parts. According to Spiering (2004, 128) a clear agreement exists, that 
the prefix ‘Euro’ is used to refer to the EU and/or the EU’s precursors. On its own, the 
suffix ‘-ism’ is used to show a political ideology. The in between word ‘sceptic,’ which 
comes from an ancient-Greek philosophy school of ‘scepticism,’ originates from the 
fourth century BC when Phyrron outlined scepticism as a mindset where a belief’s or 
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opinion’s validity is not accepted a priori, meaning that real knowledge of things is es-
sentially not possible (Leconte, 2010, 5; Ultan and Ornek, 2015, 50), but according to 
Hooghe and Marks (2007, 119-120) the word’s meaning has diffused from the classical 
scepticism and has now come to mean “an attitude of doubt or a disposition of disbelief” 
(Ibid, 119). In general, there is a consensus that ‘sceptic’ is defined as ‘doubtful’ in the 
term (Spiering 2004, 128). 
 
The literature on Euroscepticism largely follows the meanings offered to the parts of the 
term when defining it as a whole, as it is explained similarly by various authors, although 
some differences remain. The change in the connotation of Euroscepticism can, for ex-
ample, also be seen in the OED, where ‘Eurosceptic’ was defined as “a person who is not 
enthusiastic about increasing the powers of the European Union” (Harmsen and Spiering, 
2004, 15), but where it has over time changed into “a person who is opposed to increasing 
the powers of the European Union” (Eurosceptic, 2017). Further discussion of the term is 
seen in the substantial literature and research on the topic, from what two main schools 
of Euroscepticism studies have emerged – Sussex and North-Carolina (Mudde, 2012). 
Although both of those concentrate on party-based Euroscepticism studies, which is not 
the focal point of this thesis, they try to give their own theoretical and conceptual frame-
work to Euroscepticism to argue for their approaches (Ibid). The approach of the authors 
of the Sussex school, based on works of Taggart and Szczerbiak, is more concerned with 
defining Euroscepticism and giving it a framework from country-based study point 
(Mudde, 2012, 194-196), which is needed for this thesis. 
 
One of the earliest academic definitions of Euroscepticism was offered by Paul Taggart, 
from the Sussex school, in an article from 1998, where he offered that the term “expresses 
the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and un-
qualified opposition to the process of European integration” (Taggart, 1998, 366), which 
Taggart and Szczerbiak have in their later works redefined (2002; 2008). Almost ten years 
after the first attempt, Hooghe and Marks (2007, 120), who belong to the North-Carolina 
school, explain Euroscepticism as being doubtful or disbelieving of Europe and/or Euro-
pean integration in general and concur with various other authors that Euroscepticism 
involves a variety of critical positions, including outright opposition but not necessarily 
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a hostile attitude (Leconte, 2010, 5), on the subject of European integration, showing the 
diffused meaning of the term. Therefore a narrower framework is needed to conduct the 
analysis part of the thesis later.  
 
One of the dimensions for a narrower conceptual frame was developed by Taggart and 
Szczerbiak as Szczerbiak argued that the term Euroscepticism needed to be clarified to 
understand what it encompasses and thus distinction between hard and soft Euroscepti-
cism was proposed (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2000, 6). They discuss the meanings of the 
distinctions also in their later works, where hard Euroscepticism was at first defined as 
“principled opposition to the EU and European integration” (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 
2002, 7) with the possibility of a withdrawalist approach and/or being opposed to the way 
European integration is being conceived at the time. Soft Euroscepticism was defined as 
a situation where there is no “principled objection to European integration or EU mem-
bership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression 
of qualified opposition to the EU,” and where national interest may take a form of “being 
at odds with the EU’s trajectory” (Ibid). Following the definition, policy Euroscepticism 
– being against measures of planned political and economic integration expressed by op-
position to specific EU policies; and national-interest Euroscepticism – using the na-
tional-interest rhetoric in debates of the EU, can be derived from soft Euroscepticism 
(Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2000, 6-7). In their more extensive research of Euroscepticism 
a few years later, Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008), after considering the criticism made 
about their definitions, redefine hard Euroscepticism as “principled opposition to the pro-
ject of European integration as embodied in the EU” and soft Euroscepticism as “opposi-
tion to the EU’s current or future planned trajectory based on the further extension of 
competencies that the EU is planning to make” (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008, 247–248), 
although they did not provide a clear distinction between them. 
 
Another kind of distinction between the terms ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ has been made to study 
Euroscepticism. Following the work of Van Klingeren, Boomgaarden and De Vreese 
(2013, 689-690), hard and soft ‘factors,’ when referring to Euroscepticism’s explanation, 
have been distinguished in the research of public opinion on EU and European integra-
tion. According to Van Klingeren, Boomgaarden and De Vreese (2013, 690), the term 
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‘hard factors’ is, in the field of public opinion, conceptualized as utilitarian and economic 
aspects of Euroscepticism and ‘soft factors’ as identity and cultural aspects, both these 
approaches having been used to study Euroscepticism. The factors are framed and used 
by political actors and constructed also in political debate (Hooghe and Marks, 2007, 125) 
to argue for one’s approach. Although efforts have been made to see if the public opinion 
on the EU has been influenced more by either set of factors at different time points (e.g. 
Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Van Klingeren, Boomgaarden and De Vreese, 2013), it has yet 
to receive any empirical evidence of it (Van Klingeren, Boomgaarden and De Vreese, 
2013, 689-690). Albeit the literature shows that the research of public opinion on the EU 
is mostly based on quantitative data and surveys, the definitions of the factors provided 
could still prove to be useful in this thesis to add to the framework of Euroscepticism 
rhetoric used by prime ministers. 
 
Other concepts for theoretical framework of Euroscepticism have also been put forward. 
For example, Kopecký and Mudde (2002) proposed a categorisation, where four types of 
party-positions on European integration - Euroenthusiasts, Europragmatists, Eurosceptics 
and Eurorejects - are described along axes of EU pessimist/optimist and Europhobe/Eu-
rophile (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002, 300-303). The first axis describes a party’s support 
or opposition to European integration as an underlying idea of the EU, whereas the latter 
shows the support or opposition towards the EU’s present or future planned trajectory 
(Ibid). Euroenthusiasts are pro-integration and pro-trajectory; Europragmatists are anti-
integration, pro-trajectory; Eurosceptics are pro-integration, anti-trajectory; and Eu-
rorejects are anti-integration and anti-trajectory (Ibid). Harmsen and Spiering (2004, 19-
20) and Szczerbiak and Taggart (2003, 10) also bring out a continuum that was offered 
by Flood (2002, 5; as seen in Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2003, 10), where positions towards 
EU and European integration were separated into six points – rejectionist, revisionist, 
minimalist, gradualist and reformist. These approaches will not be used in the thesis as 
Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008, 246; 2003, 10-11) have pointed out that the concepts face 
a generic problem of being more complex and fine-grained in their typology and therefore 
Euroscepticism actors are “more difficult to operationalise and categorise” (Szczerbiak 
and Taggart, 2003, 10) in them, as it would take a lot of data, without imprecisions or 
second-guessing the given information, to precisely pin the actors to one category. 
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This thesis’ goal is not to offer any new definitions or approaches to Euroscepticism, but 
to analyse the study material in the framework of already existing concepts described 
above, as they have proven to be applicable to the research in the field, the hard/soft 
distinction being considered as “particularly productive” (Gifford, 2014, 2). Therefore 
the thesis adopts the typologies of Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008) and Van Klingeren, 
Boomgaarden and De Vreese (2013) into the analysis and leaves out the concepts offered 
by Kopecký and Mudde (2002) and Flood (2002, 5; as seen in Szczerbiak and Taggart, 
2003, 10) following Szczerbiak and Taggart’s (2003, 10) criticism of these typologies 
needing a larger amount of data and the thesis using only a limited number of speeches 
in the analysis.  
 
1.2 British Euroscepticism 
 
To see how the approach of British Euroscepticism is used in the rhetoric under analysis, 
another layer will be added to the framework by looking into specific cultural and identity 
factors of British Euroscepticism, as the factors motivate Euroscepticism differently in 
each country (McLaren, 2002). The importance of the factors is to see where Euroscepti-
cism stems from (Taggart, 1998), in this case, in Britain, and assess Euroscepticism in the 
country accordingly to understand it (Leconte, 2010, 5). 
 
Following the academic works on the subject of British Euroscepticism, it is necessary to 
note that the EU is used interchangeably with ‘Europe’ (Daddow, 2013, 211) in the United 
Kingdom (UK)-EU discussion, making it a discourse of ‘Britain and Europe’ (Spiering, 
2015, 8). The term ‘Britain’ is also acknowledged as a “problematic construction that 
excludes Northern Ireland” (Gifford, 2014, 1), but is used in order to contribute to the 
discussion.  
 
Appearing at first as an English phenomenon, Euroscepticism has had a particular con-
notation in the British context, where it has been pointed to as a broader phenomenon 
called “cultural anti-Europeanism,” (Harmsen and Spiering, 2004, 13) which is not just 
an opposition to European integration’s institutional forms (Ibid, 13-16), but includes a 
deeper disconnect between Britain and the EU (Spiering, 2015, 8). 
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The first of the cultural and identity factors that contribute to the disconnection between 
Britain and Europe can be called, after Daddow’s (2013) work, a geography-psychology 
link. Britain is geographically separated from continental Europe, as it is an island, but 
that does not account for the psychological or emotional remoteness (Daddow, 2013, 212-
213), which can be seen in the discourse of Britain and Europe, where Europe is thought 
of as an another place (Grant, 2008, 2), as being “over there” (Daddow, 2013, 213), as an 
outland (Spiering, 2015), as being “abroad” (Spiering, 2004, 144) or an alien entity (Ibid), 
as well as Britain being thought as an “outsider” (Daddow, 2015) in European politics 
throughout history. The distinction of Britain and Continental Europe is also seen 
throughout literature (e.g. Spiering, 2004). Furthermore, the British have thought of Eu-
rope as a choice for them to be in or out of, but mostly semi-detached from, and they have 
not perceived themselves as a truly European nation (Daddow, 2013, 214). 
 
This psychological remoteness is argued to stem from the UK’s history of being an Em-
pire and losing this status, as well as having an ongoing attachment to the Commonwealth 
(Spiering, 2015, 7). According to Spiering (2004, 142), the loss of an empire constituted 
to a national identity crisis, where the British did not know who they were anymore and 
their Euroscepticism is thus a reaction to a “traumatised national sense of being” (Spier-
ing, 2004, 142). Having an empire and colonies in the past, the British also focused more 
on their maritime experience of trade and emigration-immigration taking place outside of 
Europe (Grant, 2008, 2) and still claim closer ties to the US, Canada, Australia and India, 
for example, (Daddow, 2013, 213) than Europe, which shows one of the reasons for Brit-
ish Euroscepticism. Bevir, Daddow and Schnapper (2015, 10) argue that the sentimental 
vision that the British have of the Commonwealth, and also the perceived common values, 
law and shared institutions within it, are a part of British Euroscepticism today, as the 
relationship is set above Europe and other countries because of the close links. The geo-
graphical-psychological link therefore greatly contributes to the discourse of British Eu-
roscepticism. 
 
Another factor contributing to Euroscepticism among the British is the British history, 
more specifically, the history relating to Britain’s role in the Second World War. Spiering 
(2004, 137) notes, that Britain’s international position after WWII was perceived to be 
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different to the countries of Continental Europe. This stems from the feelings of grandeur 
(Spiering, 2004, 140) that the British had as they saw themselves as saviours of Europe 
and putting on a (almost) single-handed effort to defeat Nazi-Germany (Corner, 2007, 
466-467). The British still think of WWII as one of their finest hours and do not want to 
supress the proudness or moral superiority coming from that (Grant, 2008, 2-3). Britain 
was not the place of war or the Holocaust, but Europe was, and this added to the feelings 
of detachment from the continent (Spiering, 2015, 12). Also, after being torn up in the 
war, other European countries wanted to move on and supported cooperation and integra-
tion to achieve it (Grant, 2008, 2). UK did not have to make that choice, as it had the 
options to continue and rely on its special relationships with the Commonwealth and the 
USA, but arguably having too much fate in them, as Britain not supporting the EU and 
integration has brought up the argument of “Britain having missed the bus in Europe” 
(Spiering, 2004, 137), which nourishes the Euroscepticism.  
 
Correlating to the previous argument, another one is made for the British Euroscepticism 
stemming from history, which is coming from the viewpoint of the UK and Europe having 
“separate histories in general” (Shore, 2002, 228; as seen in Daddow, 2013, 215). Similar 
to the positions argued after WWII, earlier European history is also seen intertwined with 
dark periods of oppression and tyranny, but the UK has had history of increasing individ-
ual freedoms, which is now being interfered by undemocratic and intruding EU that en-
croaches on those British liberties (Daddow, 2013, 216).  
 
British media makes for the third cultural factor in British Euroscepticism and is widely 
discussed amongst scholars. Lubbers and Scheepers (2010, 792-93) argue that country-
specific attitudes towards EU are also caused by the knowledge passed on through media 
about the EU and in the countries that contribute to the EU budget substantially, what the 
UK does/did, Euroscepticism is increased through negative connotation of the EU in me-
dia. The British media has been described as ‘powerful’ (Grant, 2008, 3) and ‘hostile’ 
(Spiering, 2015, 7) or ‘negative’ (Daddow, 2015, 78) towards the EU and as having in-
flammatory stories increasing the Euroscepticism in Britain, especially by the coverage 
of EU budget disputes (Bevir, Daddow and Schnapper, 2015, 2). There are two main 
reasons for the Euroscepticism in the papers – papers identifying with a main political 
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party or papers’ commercial considerations, of which the latter is more important because 
of the intense competition between daily-newspapers that are not sold by subscription and 
therefore look for sensational stories, which the EU makes a good base for (Spiering, 
2004, 139, 146). 
 
It could be argued, that the British being Eurosceptic (just) because consuming the Euro-
sceptic media is not reasonable (Spiering, 2004, 133), and that some of the best media 
concerns covering the topic of EU (Financial Times, The Economist, Reuters) are based 
in the UK (Grant, 2008, 3). The topic is here discussed because of the substantial consid-
eration of it in literature about British Euroscepticism (e.g. Anderson, 2004; Lubbers and 
Scheepers, 2010). 
 
One more cultural aspect of British Euroscepticism is briefly discussed in the works of 
Spiering (2004) and Grant (2008) and that is the British ruling classes – political, media 
and business leaders – being Eurosceptics themselves as their formative experiences 
while growing up have not been the same as their Continental counterparts’ (Spiering, 
2004, 140). This has resulted in their opinions being different from other EU member 
states’ leaders and in most of them not having sought to lead or educate the public on the 
beneficial aspects of belonging to the EU (Grant, 2008, 5), contributing to Euroscepticism 
in the country. Political leaders, especially, have embraced the topic of Euroscepticism as 
it stirs emotions and offers for a rich rhetoric (Spiering, 2004, 145), which will be looked 
for in the analysis later in the thesis.  
 
Some authors (Corner, 2007; Spiering, 2015; Taggart, 2013) also discuss the UK as being 
or feeling like it is itself an “EU in miniature” (Corner, 2007, 467), which factors in Brit-
ish Euroscepticism, because it is an integrated state, of what several nationalities with 
different identities are a part of, and where structural arrangement of institutional powers 
varies in competences and locations. This could lead to questioning if Euroscepticism is 
more of a English than British phenomenon, as the Irish, Scottish and Welsh are not that 
Eurosceptic (Corner, 2007; Spiering, 2015), but this is an another research topic not dis-
cussed here. 
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The economic factor for British Euroscepticism should also be briefly explained as it is a 
salient issue in British objection to European integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2007, 120) 
and offers another topic to the analysis later in the thesis. UK joined the precursor of EU, 
the European Economic Community (EEC), in 1973, as the economic Golden Age was 
ending, and unlike the first six members of the community, whose economies had pros-
pered in the 1960s, in part thanks to the EEC, Britain had to deal with an oil crisis, rapidly 
increasing inflation and a stricken economy to be bailed out by IMF in the first few years 
after the entry (Corner, 2007, 466) resulting in the UK being called “the sick man of 
Europe” (Grant, 2008, 3). Also, two issues that were not addressed in the 1973 joining 
are argued to contribute to the semi-detachment from the EU, first of those being not 
knowing how the negotiated economical arrangements would function in practice and the 
second being the role of a net contributor to EEC budget that Britain took and it has since 
been a flashpoint in Britain-EU discourse (Bevir, Daddow and Schnapper, 2015, 2). So a 
national-level economical aspect of British Euroscepticism will be looked for in the anal-
ysis, not focusing on individual-level aspects accounting for economical opposition to the 
EU as that is a topic of research in the field of public opinion. 
 
The five cultural and identity factors, plus one economic factor discussed above will serve 
as an additional framework for analysing rhetorics of British prime ministers as they have 
proven to be important to the discourse on Britain and Europe. The approach taken in this 
thesis is that Thatcher, Cameron and May personify the British Euroscepticism as the 
prime ministers of the UK. Therefore the research questions – which elements, if any at 
all, of British Euroscepticism are prevalent in the prime ministers’ approaches; how has 
the British Euroscepticism changed; did the different approaches, in the case of evolve-
ment, factor in leading the Brits to saying ‘yes’ to Brexit; and giving a conceptual map of 
the last 30 years of British Euroscepticism, are applied to their speeches. 
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2. ANALYSIS 
 
 
In order to answer the abovementioned questions, an analysis on the speeches of the three 
British prime ministers is conducted in this chapter. Methodology of the analysis, over-
view of the speeches and a discussion on the results are also offered here. 
 
2.1 Methodology 
 
This thesis is written as a qualitative research paper. To conduct the research and frame 
the evolution of British Euroscepticism, four speeches of British prime ministers are sub-
sequently analysed and compared by using discourse analysis. This research method is 
found the most useful in this case, because discourse analysis enables to look for specific 
content and words, but also meanings behind the words, and it allows to see the speeches, 
which are the basis for conducting the research, in a specific context (Titscher et al., 2000, 
25-27; Nordquist, 2017; Tannen, 2012). Therefore, it offers a good base for later to follow 
through with the comparative aspect of the paper. No qualitative data analysis programme 
is used here as the quantity of the data is small. The aim is to develop a conceptual map 
of different components of 30 years of British Euroscepticism. 
 
Prime ministers’ speeches were chosen to be the basis for this thesis as it is assumed here 
that the prime ministers are the voice of the people in international politics conveying the 
feelings of the nation (Hennessy, 2011), and speeches are consistent sources of literature 
(Titscher et al., 2000, 25). The choice of speeches to be analysed is key to a successful 
analysis, because for an adequate comparison, the speeches would have to be structurally 
similar. The focus has been on finding speeches, where the prime ministers talk about 
Britain’s relationship with the EU in depth. Also, the speeches should have not been pre-
sented to only party congresses, where the speeches could have been influenced more by 
the parties’ viewpoints than the overall British opinion. For this research, public speeches 
of the prime ministers were found and one from each was picked, where the structure of 
the speech was most similar to the other – which does not mean that the contents were 
exactly the same, although the question of subjectivity still remains. The speeches could 
be seen in the empirical materials. 
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Choosing the speeches on which to base the thesis on and the timespan chosen for this 
thesis are interconnected. The first speech to analyse was chosen from Thatcher, as she 
was the prime minister who was in office from the late ‘70s, after the UK joined the EU 
(EEC back then) in 1973 and held a referendum on continued membership in 1975. The 
Bruges speech from Thatcher (Thatcher, 1988) was chosen as the starting point for this 
thesis and analysis, because according to Usherwood (2004, 5), the Bruges speech can be 
seen as a key building block in developing the British Euroscepticism. He adds that with 
this speech, Thatcher was the first European leader to clearly break from 1980s Europho-
ria and it had a long term impact (Ibid). It is also assumed here, that by the time of 
Thatcher’s Bruges Speech British people had seen the benefits they had gotten from stay-
ing in the EU, and the doubts that still lingered, more clearly than around the time of the 
referendum in 1975.  
 
The other end of the timeline chosen for this thesis was based on and around the subject 
of Brexit, as it is timely and brought the topic of the UK-EU relationship back into lime-
light, making the topic rich in opinions and rhetoric and also having a large-scale media 
coverage offering the opportunity to access and read speeches on the issue. To understand 
and frame British Euroscepticism around the time of Brexit, speeches from both, the pre-
Brexit prime minister Cameron, and post-Brexit prime minster May, were chosen, as they 
account for the British approach to Euroscepticism in the last few years and also assum-
edly in the coming few years when the Brexit negotiations are taking place, making the 
timespan of the thesis about 30 years.   
 
To study Cameron’s approach, his speeches that had been made pre-Brexit and focused 
on the topic of UK-EU relationship in depth, were looked into, to get the most accurate 
point of view. In the light of this, the Prime Minister’s Speech on Europe (2015), made 
in November, was chosen, but as it is in big part based on his Bloomberg speech (2013), 
the later has been taken as the main focus point, as Cameron explains his reasons for 
Euroscepticism more thoroughly in the Bloomberg speech.  
 
In order to frame the British Euroscepticism post-Brexit, May’s speeches after becoming 
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prime minster were looked into and similarly to Cameron and Thatcher, speeches focus-
ing on the UK-EU relationship in depth were looked for. As at the beginning of her term, 
the prime minister did not offer substantially long speeches on the topic, the Global Brit-
ain speech made in January of 2017s in Lancaster House, where May outlines a 12-point 
Brexit plan, was chosen.  
 
Using discourse analysis, i.e. studying the abovementioned speeches in the context of 
Euroscepticism, keywords taken from the theoretical part of the thesis are looked for in 
the speeches to analyse them and to understand and frame the evolution of British Euro-
scepticism. First of the keywords is the geographical-psychological link, where distanc-
ing Britain and Europe or the EU from each other or separating the two entities com-
pletely, and the reasons behind it, is analysed. How the prime ministers construe the re-
lationship between the UK and the EU; how they call Europe/the EU; how they see the 
relationship with the rest of the European nations; which geographical words are men-
tioned in this respect; and referring to relationships with other international entities (e.g. 
countries, the Commonwealth) are here considered. The second factor looked for is 
speaking about British history and differentiating the British from Europe because or 
based on that. This follows in two directions, firstly in that sentences implying moral 
superiority stemming from the WWII; and secondly in that the prime ministers discussing 
the centralization of powers to Brussels or implying discontent with the EU encroaching 
on British liberties, are looked for. The third point in analysing the speeches is the issue 
of media and how it is mentioned, if at all, by the prime ministers. The fourth factor 
considered when conducting the analysis is of the ruling class approach to Euroscepti-
cism, where rich rhetoric and emotion stirring is analysed. Under rich rhetoric colourful 
language and expressions are looked for; topics of security and migration and use of ad-
jectives exalting the UK/the Brits is here considered as emotion stirring. The fifth con-
sideration is the topic of Britain being the EU in miniature. Referring to different nation-
alities belonging under Britain or living in the UK and/or speaking about diversity and 
flexibility of the UK is looked for in the discourses. The sixth factor is the topic of econ-
omy, where it is analysed on which aspects of the economy the prime ministers (mainly) 
focus on and which aspects of economy they show support or opposition to. 
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To frame the wider approach to Euroscepticism of the prime ministers’, an overall anal-
ysis of the speeches offers the differentiation of soft and hard Euroscepticism. The first 
differentiation which will be used is offered by Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008, 247-248), 
where policy- and national-interest Euroscepticism under soft Euroscepticism are also 
considered as they add another layer of framework to the speeches and offer a slightly 
clearer distinction between the approaches. The second theoretical approach to hard and 
soft Euroscepticism under which the speeches are analysed, was made by Van Klingeren, 
Boomgaarden and de Vreese (2013, 690), and where under hard factors utilitarian and 
economic, and under soft factors identity and cultural aspects are considered. This typol-
ogy is used to provide an additional framework to the approaches and allows a compari-
son to be made between the concepts of soft and hard Euroscepticism from different au-
thors, but to also see which could be considered more fruitful in the research of the UK-
EU relationship. All of these topics looked for in the speeches should offer a conceptual 
map of evolution of British Euroscepticism. 
 
2.2 Overview of the speeches 
 
Margaret Thatcher’s speech to the College of Europe, named “The Bruges Speech,” was 
held in Bruges on the 20 September 1988, arguably with the background context of 
Thatcher being concerned about perceived Jacques Delor’s power grab (Peters, 2013).  It 
concentrates on outlining points to make European Community more effective and lays 
out key matters that it should follow, bringing forth the problems it should deal with as 
the Community wishes to improve itself and grow wider across Europe, as much as it was 
possible considering the iron curtain at the time (Thatcher, 1988).  
 
David Cameron’s “Bloomberg Speech”, named after the venue of the speech, was held 
on the 23 January 2013. The impetus for the speech came from the increasing pressure of 
the Eurosceptics from The Conservative and the UK Independence Party on the prime 
minister, who had promised to answer the questions of discontentment of the UK-EU 
relationship and referendum-calls in a speech (Hunt, 2013). The speech is focused on the 
background of the UK-EU relationship and issues that Cameron feels need to be solved 
in order to lessen the discontentment on the subject, which leads up to a promise of an in-
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out referendum (Cameron, 2013). Cameron’s “Speech on Europe,” held at the Chatham 
House on the 10 November 2015 is an extension of the “Bloomberg Speech,” focusing 
mainly on the themes discussed in the “Bloomberg Speech” and adding the element of 
the crises occurring at the time, ending with a discussion about the referendum (Cameron, 
2015). 
 
Theresa May’s “Brexit Speech” was held on the 17 January 2017, over half a year after 
the Brexit referendum, at the Lancaster House. The incentive for the speech was to answer 
the questions pertaining to how and when is Brexit supposed to be conducted. May 
touches on the subject of the UK-EU relationship and its background, and lays out a 12-
point Brexit plan in the speech with an idea of the future relationship (May, 2017). 
 
2.3 Analysis of the speeches 
 
In order to compare the speeches and discuss if and how has the British Euroscepticism 
changed over time and to see if the hypothesis of British Euroscepticism constantly evolv-
ing towards hard Euroscepticism is valid and thus factoring in leading the Brits to saying 
‘yes’ to Brexit, each prime minister’s approach to the UK-EU topic is first described and 
analyzed.  
 
2.3.1 Thatcher’s approach  
 
Starting from Thatcher’s Bruges Speech (1988), it could be said, that in the center of 
British Euroscepticism lies the perceived British superiority, both moral and economic. 
Thatcher also uses a rich rhetoric from the start of the speech, bringing out that her speak-
ing on the topic of Europe may be perceived by some as Genghis Khan speaking “on the 
virtues of peaceful coexistence” (Thatcher, 1988). There are many compliments made to 
the venue of the speech, the College of Europe, as well, where words ‘magnificent’, ‘glo-
rious’, ‘vital’ and ‘distinguished’ are used (Ibid), giving off a feeling of them being used 
(almost) ironically to the reader. This sets a Eurosceptical background, intended or not, 
for the whole speech. 
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The economic factor is extensively discussed in Thatcher’s speech, as it is seen that the 
British have taken a lead-position in open markets, market services, air transport, in free 
movement of capital and also in being the biggest financial center in Europe (Thatcher, 
1988). The rest of Europe had yet to catch up in economic policies and the reforms done 
thus far in the EC were not substantial enough to ease the Euroscepticism stemming from 
economic point of view. This led to Thatcher bringing out ‘requirements’ (Ibid) – a word 
strongly indicating that something needs to be done in order to not have an unfavourable 
outcome, arguably for both parties – for economic reform.  
 
Historical aspect of British Euroscepticism in Thatcher’s speech comes from the British 
role in preventing Europe falling under a single power over the centuries, but more im-
portantly from the role played in the World Wars, where the Brits fought and died for 
Europe’s freedom, keeping alive ‘the flame of liberty’, also being noted that the ‘libera-
tion of Europe’ was ‘mounted’ from their island (Thatcher, 1988). The second form of 
historical British Euroscepticism, where discontent with regulation coming from Brussels 
is looked for, is prominent in Thatcher’s speech in that it is said that decisions need not 
to be taken by bureaucracy nor is it necessary to centralize power (Ibid), which also ties 
into the topic of Brits feeling like the EU in miniature, in wanting their own power-struc-
tures to make most decisions. In addition, the Community itself should not be ‘ossified’ 
by excessive regulation nor be constantly modified following ‘abstract intellectual con-
cepts’ (Ibid).  
 
The geographical form of British Euroscepticism is not prevalent in the speech, but the 
word ‘island’ is used once in the context described above, and Britain having looked ‘to 
wider horizons’ is also mentioned (Thatcher, 1988). Although, psychological link to Eu-
roscepticism is seen in Thatcher’s approach. Britain is described as a place where sanc-
tuary from tyranny, which had spread in the rest of Europe, was offered (Ibid), adding to 
the moral superiority of the British. Also prevalent in the psychology field is the topic of 
the British approach, which is found the best and comes forth in having ‘plain common 
sense’ to have frontier controls; Thatcher finding it ‘folly’ to have a European identikit; 
not looking towards ‘utopian goals’ like the rest; and finding it important to focus on 
Atlantic community, which is seen as the ‘noblest inheritance’ and ‘greatest strength’ of 
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the British (and Europeans) (Thatcher, 1988), thus distancing the British from the rest of 
Europe. 
 
Leveling the Euroscepticism in the speech are the sentences, where it is said that belong-
ing to the European Community and the future in it is a positive feature, although it should 
be a community of different nations not of one European nation (Thatcher, 1988). Fur-
thermore, there are aspects brought out, that imply a strong connection between the UK 
and Europe both historically and culturally. The cultural aspect is seen in parts where it 
said that the British culture is a legacy of European culture like any other European na-
tion’s culture, as British architecture – churches and cathedrals, literature and language 
stem from Europe; European legacy of political ideas was used whilst working on the 
Magna Charta; the rule of law from European thought was implemented; and most im-
portantly the idea of Christendom, which was prevalent in the rest of Europe and on which 
the ideas of personal liberty and human rights are still based in today’s British mentality, 
was taken over (Ibid). The historical closeness comes from Britain being a part of Roman 
Empire; British ancestors – Saxons, Celts, Danes – originating from continental Europe; 
and the nation’s restructuring by Normans and Angevins (Ibid).  
 
Other counterarguments for Euroscepticism are also seen as Thatcher uses the word ‘we’, 
meaning the Europeans with the British or the Community; the expressions ‘family of 
nations’ and ‘facing the world as Europe’ to imply close bond to other European nations 
and signifying the British belonging to Europe; and stresses economic and defence co-
operation, especially belonging to the Single Market (Thatcher, 1988). The last argument 
could be seen as a pro-Euroscepticism factor too, because the co-operation should occur 
between nations, not as a unified front.   
 
Thatcher’s approach is therefore mainly economically, historically and ruling class based 
Eurosceptical, with a focus on policy- and national-interest Euroscepticism, making it in 
Szczerbiak and Taggart’s (2000; 2008) typology soft Euroscepticism. Some hard Euro-
scepticism in that interpretation could be noted as well as it is brought out that the EC in 
only one means to the end, not an end in itself, nor could the British prosper in an ‘inward-
looking narrow-minded’ club (Thatcher, 1988), which the EC had a probability to turn 
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into. In Van Klingeren, Boomgaarden and De Vreese’s (2013) typology, Thatcher’s ap-
proach is both hard and soft as it includes both economic and cultural-identity factors, 
with more emphasis on the first.  
 
2.3.2 Cameron’s narrative 
 
It could be said based on the fact that Cameron promised to conduct a referendum on 
British membership in the EU in his Bloomberg speech (2013) that the former prime 
minister’s approach to the EU was a form of hard Euroscepticism (Szczerbiak and Tag-
gart, 2008) in that the promised referendum constituted as an objection to the EU and 
integration. At the same time, Cameron’s view could also be considered pragmatic as 
with the calling out of a referendum he answered the pressures from the society (Hunt, 
2013) but it was not his personal viewpoint on the UK-EU relationship. Concurring with 
that, the analysis of the speech brings out that there are several aspects of soft Euroscep-
ticism (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008)) used in Cameron’s approach and which make up 
for most of the Euroscepticism used in the speech. 
 
The first form of soft Euroscepticism comes from the geographical-psychological link of 
British Euroscepticism. Cameron expresses that the British have a character of an island 
nation, which was shaped by their geography and therefore psychology, making the Brit-
ish independent, forthright, passionate about their sovereignty and therefore having a 
British sensibility to look at the EU practically, not emotionally (Cameron, 2013). Dis-
tancing the British further from the Europeans, the expression ‘European partners’, not a 
more familiar term, is used; it is said that there does not exist a single European demos; 
and it is brought out that the Brits are proud of the connections to the rest of the world 
(Ibid). Cameron (2015) has later repeated the notion of the British being a proud inde-
pendent nation, which has its own history and traditions; and has emphasised the UK’s 
geographical status as an island. In addition, Cameron sees belonging to the EU and being 
an independent state as two different worlds, in saying that the best of both is wanted 
(Cameron, 2015). Geographical-psychological link to British Euroscepticism is therefore 
represented in Cameron’s approach, but it is not the most prevalent one. 
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The most prominent feature of Cameron’s speeches is the historical aspect of British Eu-
roscepticism. From the start of the Bloomberg speech (2013) Cameron approaches the 
topic of Britain having played an important role in the European history - separating Brit-
ish history from the continent’s at the same time; and especially in the WWII by keeping 
‘the flame of liberty alight’ and later on in tearing down communism. Britain was also 
seen as a ‘haven’ to people fleeing tyranny and prosecution (Cameron, 2013). This rhet-
oric is continued in Cameron’s 2015 speech, where the expressions ‘Great War’ – it has 
not been specified whether the word ‘great’ refers to the number of people or countries 
involved in the war or the war being ‘great’ because the British won – and throwing off 
a ‘tyrant’s yoke’ in Europe are used to show British (moral) superiority. In general it is 
seen that Britain has contributed significantly for Europe’s nations being able to enjoy 
freedom (Ibid) adding to the point of Britain being Eurosceptical because of their histor-
ical individual effort to help the rest of the continent.  
 
Making British Euroscepticism more history based in Cameron’s approach is the focus 
on the second explanation of history’s link to Euroscepticism. Cameron describes in the 
Bloomberg speech (2013) how there is an ‘acutely’ felt lack of democratic accountability 
in Britain, where democratic consent for the EU is ‘wafer thin’ as well, and people are 
never given a say about the treaties that are implemented in the Union. That lays the base 
for the opinion that the EU is something that is done to people, not on their behalf, and it 
interferes with the national life (Ibid). In addition, less bureaucracy with its excessive 
‘spurious’ regulation – described as an external plague - and centralization is needed, as 
Cameron insists on some power being brought back to the parliaments of the member 
states to better the ‘sclerotic ineffective’ decision making (Ibid). Cameron continues with 
the same rhetoric later as well, saying that the existing regulations bring too high of a 
burden, the migration policy is not sustainable for the British and that the EU’s acting-
speed is like the rigidity of a bloc, constituting to a great disillusionment felt by the British 
towards the EU (Cameron, 2015). All these factors are seen as the EU encroaching on 
British liberties and being undemocratic, which is why Cameron also agreed to call an in-
out referendum. 
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Economical factor of British Euroscepticism is the second focal point in Cameron’s ap-
proach. Both of the speeches cover the topic extensively. Cameron is strongly Euroscep-
tical in this aspect as, first of all it is made clear that Britain has always looked beyond 
Europe for economic reasons and that the future holds global trade of nation states (Cam-
eron, 2013) so being a part of the EU’s economic system is not enough nor perspective. 
Eurozone crisis, objecting the single currency use in Britain and considering weakness in 
economic competitiveness to be self-inflicted are described in both speeches (Cameron, 
2013; 2015) and are the main reasons for Euroscepticism in economy. It is also brought 
out that the principal motive for the Brits to be in the EU is the participation and ability 
to set the rules in the Single Market, but the previous reasons, European institutions being 
illogically expensive and Britain being forced into austerity measures in order to be a part 
of the bailout mechanism (Ibid), although of which they were relieved by the 2015 speech, 
add to the Euroscepticism. Adding to the previous, it is said in the speeches that Europe 
will be in a ‘no-man’s land’ (Cameron, 2013) and risks being left behind (2015) if the 
EU’s economic policies will not be reformed. 
 
The EU in miniature aspect of British Euroscepticism is not largely touched up on, but it 
is said that the UK takes the lead in being one of the most cosmopolitan and open coun-
tries in the world (Cameron, 2015). The EU at the same time is not capable of accommo-
dating its member state’s diversity (Cameron, 2013), which brings forth some Euroscep-
ticism on the topic. 
 
Leading up to the promise of referendum is emotion stirring use of language and rhetoric. 
Emotion stirring could be seen when describing the British nation as ‘rigorously practi-
cal’, ‘obstinately down to earth’, ‘natural debunkers’, and Britain being one of the strong-
est powers of Europe, also having its capital city as a global icon (Cameron, 2013; 2015). 
Emotional topics of migration, climate, energy supplies, fairness, security and terrorism 
are also prevalent in Cameron’s speeches (Ibid). To show British superiority economi-
cally as well, Cameron (2013) uses rhetoric of the British almost single-handedly invent-
ing the Single Market; that the UK is a force of liberal economic reform and adds heft to 
Europe’s influence in the world. It is later added that the UK is a “far cry from the sick 
man of Europe” (Cameron, 2015) as it was at the time of joining the EC, showing what 
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is achieved economically on national level. 
 
All the previous aspects of British Euroscepticism served as the basis for Cameron to 
promise an in-out referendum from the EU. At the same time, Cameron (2013; 2015) also 
advices caution in both of the speeches in deciding how to vote in the referendum as the 
choice made at the ballot box would perhaps be the most important decision for the British 
in our lifetimes and it should be clear that the choice which is made would be a real one.  
 
Some counterarguments to Euroscepticism in Cameron’s approach could be brought out. 
First of all, there is a distinction made that the Europeans are a ‘family’ of nations, but 
that there are ‘friends’ around the world, and the British island is geographically tied to 
the continent (Cameron, 2013, 2015). From economic point of view it is also said that 
there should be a spirit of co-operation between the Brits and Europeans; belonging to 
Single Market is greatly beneficial; and that to maintain economic security the Brits 
should stay in the EU (Ibid). Cameron stated in his later speech (2015) that he will be 
campaigning for staying in the EU with ‘all his heart and soul’ as well, as there was some 
progress already made since the Bloomberg, which was considered to show the possibility 
of reforming the EU according to the UK’s wishes. 
 
Cameron’s approach can, based on the previous discussion, be considered as soft Euro-
scepticism, where most of the discontent lies in policies of migration, economy and cen-
tralized power, making it a mainly policy-Eurosceptical view. The emphasis on reforms 
and changes, but not leaving the EU, supports that view. It might be looked at as Cameron 
himself being soft Eurosceptical, but the pressures from the society added a hard Euro-
sceptical element to the speeches. Hard Euroscepticism could also be seen in Cameron’s 
(2013) statement that the EU is not an end in itself, but a means to an end, and in the 
British people seeing the level of integration in the EU moving out of their comfort zone. 
In comparison to Van Klingeren, Boomgaarden and De Vreese’s (2013) theory, Cam-
eron’s approach is both hard and soft, with them being equally present and intertwined. 
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2.3.3 May’s approach  
 
May’s narrative is greatly focused on discussing the deal of leaving the EU, what it should 
contain and how the future of the UK is seen outside of the EU. The basis for the speech 
– that the UK has chosen to leave the EU, serves as a main point to argue for May’s 
approach being hard Euroscepticism in Szczerbiak and Taggart’s (2008) typology, as 
there is clear objection to the UK belonging in the EU. Adding to the hard Euroscepticism 
is May’s point that what matters are the ends, not the means, like the EU, and the view 
that the choice to leave has a great prize in constituting to ‘opportunities ahead’ (May, 
2017), which shows the support for Brexit and hard Euroscepticism. There are also as-
pects of soft Euroscepticism (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008) seen in May’s speech, which 
are used as the reasoning behind the hard Euroscepticism. 
 
The first aspect of soft Euroscepticism in the speech is the title of the speech – ‘Global 
Britain’, and the multiple time usage of the expression ‘great, global nation’, which shows 
the Brits changing their focus away from Europe towards global politics, using the ex-
pression ‘embracing the world’ (May, 2017). It is also said, that belonging to the EU came 
at the expense of the global ties that the UK had before (Ibid). Adding to the geographical-
psychological link in British Euroscepticism are the descriptions of British mindset, his-
tory and culture being internationalist; seeing the EU as something that is abroad; the 
British being out-ward looking, independent and an island nation (May, 2017). Common-
wealth is also mentioned in the speech, constituting a unique and global relationship for 
the British (Ibid). Distancing the British from the rest of Europe psychologically is also 
seen, as the other European nations are called friends, allies, partners, neighbours, but 
never a family; the word relatives is used in connection with a list of countries across the 
world (Ibid). It was also important to May to restore the national self-determination (Ibid), 
bringing together the geographical-psychological Euroscepticism and the part of Euro-
scepticism stemming from British history, where the liberties of the British have been 
corrupted. 
 
This kind of historical aspect of British Euroscepticism is prevalent in May’s speech as it 
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is emphasised on multiple occasions that the British have a strong attachment to demo-
cratic government; want to restore parliamentary democracy; account the governments 
directly; decide on changes themselves and have the control over laws, especially in the 
aspect concerning immigration; and that there is no need for too strong supranational 
institutions, which the EU is considered as (May, 2017). Behind all these statements is 
the view that the EU is undemocratic, intrusive and has encroached on British liberties, 
coming from the aspect of British history being separate from the rest of Europe’s. The 
aspect of British Euroscepticism stemming from the history of WWII is not used in May’s 
speech. 
 
In connection with the EU being considered undemocratic and wanting to bring back 
powers to the UK, the British approach to Euroscepticism coming from them seeing them-
selves as the EU in miniature is evident. It is expressed that future laws being made in 
Westminster, Cardiff, Edinburgh, and Belfast, and having devolved administrations is 
important to the British (May, 2017). The same aspect is seen as well in parts where 
expressions of ‘every nation and area’; ‘all parts of the UK’; ‘one great union of nations 
and people’; and ‘precious union between four nations’ (Ibid) are used. May also empha-
sises that the UK is one of the most racially diverse countries with multicultural popula-
tion and that as the EU bends toward uniformity and not flexibility it cannot deal with the 
diversity of nations as well as the British do (Ibid), adding to the Euroscepticism in this 
field. 
 
One of the most important elements of May’s speech is the economic aspect of the new 
deal that will be negotiated. May’s approach is economically Eurosceptical in that there 
is veiled blame put on the EU not investing into British economic infrastructure, stagnat-
ing British trade, bringing up deficit that now has to be reduced, and in the British not 
agreeing to pay huge sums to the EU budget anymore (May, 2017). Trade is also a widely 
discussed topic in the economic part of the speech, where it is said that new free trade 
agreements will be made with countries outside of the EU, going as far as creating a new 
Department of International Trade for the cause, and removing barriers to trade (Ibid). 
This shows that the British were not satisfied with the trade policy in the EU and therefore 
they will not be joining/remaining in the European Single Market in any way nor be a 
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part of the Common Commercial Policy (May, 2017). The new deal that will be negoti-
ated with the EU will be ‘better’ and ‘right’ (Ibid), showing that the economic aspect is a 
major contributor to British Euroscepticism. 
 
May’s speech is also rich in emotion stirring language, as words ‘brighter’, ‘stronger’, 
‘fairer’ are used multiple times, as well as having described the UK with expressions 
‘more united’ and ‘open and tolerant’ (May, 2017). The UK and/or the British are also 
seen as the best in a number of fields, such as having the brightest students, intelligence 
capabilities, cutting-edge research, being ‘the best place’ for science and innovation, busi-
nesses being world-beaters, and the UK being one of the largest and strongest economies 
in the world (Ibid), which all constitute for the mentality of British superiority.  The words 
‘we’ and ‘our’ are mainly used to indicate the people living in Britain, not the British with 
the EU, further showing the distancing of themselves from Europeans. Emotion stirring 
in the deal-making topic could be seen in expressions ‘permanent political purgatory’ 
when speaking about transition stage out of the EU; ‘disruptive cliff-edge’ when speaking 
about having enough time to phase in new arrangements; and a ‘punitive’ deal doing 
‘calamitous self-harm’ to those who wish it (Ibid). Touching on the topics of terrorism 
and security in the speech can also be considered emotional, making May’s speech as a 
whole quite emotion-based, adding the element of strong ruling class based British Euro-
scepticism to May’s approach. 
 
May also touches on the subject of British media playing a part in referendum campaigns 
and making it harder to negotiate the right deal for Britain because of its ‘hyped up’ re-
ports and ‘stray words’ (May, 2017). This could be seen as the prime minster herself 
being Eurosceptical of British media, as it is said in the speech that it is not the prime 
minister’s job to fill the columns of newspapers (Ibid) and therefore it can be deducted 
from the statements that the British media is Eurosceptical and adds to the overall Euro-
scepticism in the country. 
 
Some counterarguments of the British being Eurosceptical could be seen in the speech, 
as topics of co-operation in several fields and promoting Europe’s security are touched 
upon (May, 2017). It is said that the UK is a European country, which shares European 
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heritage and values and will convert existing EU law into British law as well, levelling 
the Euroscepticism in the speech, but the main point of the UK supporting the EU and its 
27 member states outside of the EU remains.  
 
In Van Klingeren, Boomgaarden and De Vreese’s (2013) typology, May’s approach is 
both hard and soft as it includes economic and cultural-identity factors, with strong em-
phasis on both.  
 
2.4 Discussion 
 
Overall, it can be said that the concepts of Euroscepticism and the empirical literature 
were compatible in that the typologies discussed at the beginning of the thesis can be used 
to search for Eurosceptical elements in speeches and approaches. Concurring with Gifford 
(2014) it is notable that the hard-soft differentiation of Euroscepticism is productive when 
using Szczerbiak and Taggart’s (2008) typology, but Van Klingeren, Boomgaarden and 
De Vreese’s (2013) theory did not offer as much of a differentiation in approaches as both 
factors were notably present in all of the speeches.  
 
In order to give a framework to the evolvement of British Euroscepticism from Thatcher 
to May a comparison of the approaches has to be made. All of the factors which were 
considered to make up the British Euroscepticism and which were analysed earlier on in 
prime ministers’ speeches are compared and an element of usage of key words or phrases, 
which corroborate the discussion, is added. A summary of the comparisons of the ap-
proaches could be seen in Table 1 at the end of this discussion. 
 
Thatcher and Cameron both use the British moral superiority approach stemming from 
the British role in the WWII and from earlier European politics as an argument for one of 
the history-based factors of British Euroscepticism. The phrase ‘the Brits keeping alive 
the flame of liberty’ is employed by Thatcher (1988) as well as Cameron (2013) in this 
regard. May has not used this point of history Euroscepticism to argue for her approach, 
but has used the thought of the UK and Europe having separate histories and therefore 
the EU encroaching on British liberties heavily in the speech when talking about bringing 
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back legislature to the UK and deciding themselves on how to manage their country (May, 
2017). Cameron has also employed this approach, but not as widely as May, mainly in 
regard to economic and migration policies (Cameron, 2013; 2015), and Thatcher used it 
slightly to forewarn and prevent the centralization of powers to Brussels (1988). Thus it 
could be concluded that the history aspect of British Euroscepticism has shifted from the 
strong usage of moral superiority and slight legislative concerns to some moral superiority 
and concentrated legislative concerns to no moral superiority and wide consideration of 
legislative concerns. 
 
Although May might not have used historical moral superiority in her approach, other 
factors of the British or the UK being the best were applied throughout the speech, for 
example in ‘unique intelligence capabilities’ and in ‘science and innovation’ (May, 2017). 
This ties into the use of emotional rhetoric applied in the speeches. Cameron also employs 
this approach when describing the UK as one of the ‘strongest powers of Europe’ and 
London as a ‘global icon’ (Cameron, 2013; 2015). Thatcher’s way of using rich rhetoric 
was seen in colourful language, for example in implying herself talking about matters of 
Europe being seen as Genghis Khan speaking about peace, and ironic use of adjectives 
(Thatcher, 1988). The ruling political class’ rich rhetoric has therefore not changed in that 
it has been used in every speech, although in slightly different ways. Some change in the 
rhetorics could be seen in Thatcher wanting the EC to employ the ‘British approach’ to 
its operation (Ibid), Cameron (2015) emphasising the ‘British model of membership’ of 
the EU, and May (2017) speaking about ‘new partnership to the EU’. The narrowing focus 
of the British approach being applied to the whole of the EC/EU, then to the British just 
having a special model of relationship in the EU, to focusing on the British relationship 
with the EU outside of the Union shows the increasing hard Euroscepticism. Emotion 
stirring topic of movement of people and how open the country’s should be were also 
more implied in Cameron’s (2015) and May’s (2017) approaches, where the key word of 
‘migration’ appeared respectively 15 and 13 times, Thatcher (1998) used the word only 
once. Threats to security is also a touched upon subject by all of the prime ministers, but 
the word ‘terrorism’ is applied most by May (2017) – 6 times, once by Cameron (2013) 
and twice by Thatcher (1988). Therefore it can be concluded that May’s and Cameron’s 
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approaches to Euroscepticism rest more on migration-policy issues and British superior-
ity in a number of fields than Thatcher’s. The most Euroscepticism displayed in regards 
to threats to security is in May’s speech, implying the emotion stirring in that field. All in 
all the rhetorics have changed from overall colourful use of language to emotion stirring 
with specific topics. 
 
May (2017) was the only prime minister who touched on the subject of British media with 
a Eurosceptical approach, and as the other prime ministers have not used this feature in 
their speeches it could be said, that May’s approach to British Euroscepticism was based 
on an extra factor and therefore more Eurosceptical. 
 
May’s approach was also the one which was most focused on the UK being the EU in 
miniature as the rhetoric of the UK comprising several nations is brought up on multiple 
occasions (May, 2017). This aspect was also lightly seen in Cameron’s Bloomberg speech 
(2013), when talking about diversity, but not in Thatcher’s speech (1988). British Euro-
scepticism has therefore evolved to include to wider use of the EU in miniature factor. 
 
The most discussed Eurosceptical element of the speeches is the economy. Although it 
could be said that all of the prime ministers were Eurosceptical from the economic aspect, 
some differences in the approaches could be noted. The first point here is the pro-Single 
Market approach by Cameron (2013) and Thatcher (1998), who promote the UK belong-
ing to the Single Market and the idea itself. May (2017) however is opposed to the idea 
of belonging to the Single Market and sees no future in it for the UK, which accounts to 
May’s approach being hard Eurosceptical in the economic aspect, but Thatcher and Cam-
eron being soft Eurosceptical as they both see the need for reforms being done on the 
policy, but not removing the British from it (Cameron, 2013; 2015; Thatcher, 1988). 
Some topical changes in the economic aspect could be noted as May is more concentrated 
on trade and trading, including how to reach new trade-agreements as the British are leav-
ing the EU, and the trade being free with countries outside of the EU (May, 2017). Cam-
eron (2013; 2015) on the other hand expressed clear objection of the UK belonging to the 
Eurozone. Thatcher (1988) discusses economic policies, some progresses that had been 
made at the time in those, and discusses how the EC’s economic policies should move 
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forward. Thatcher is, therefore, the least Eurosceptical in the topical aspect of economic 
British Euroscepticism, as she sees the UK’s economy being tied to the EC’s economy in 
the future as well. May does not see the economy of the UK being tied to the EU’s other 
than by some kind of trade-partnership, being thus the most Eurosceptical in this element. 
Cameron objects to one facet of the EU’s economy, but otherwise sees the UK’s future 
in reformed EU’s economic field, which constitutes to his approach being some kind of 
middle-ground between Thatcher’s and May’s. 
 
All of the approaches also have the element of geographical-psychological link of British 
Euroscepticism in them, and all use the psychology part of the link to distance the British 
from the rest of the Europeans. Although, a shift of the speeches towards being more 
centred on Britain is seen in the usage of words such as ‘union/community’ (referring to 
the EU or the EC), ‘global’, and ‘Britain’. The first of those is used 29 times by Thatcher 
(1988), 45 and 61 times by Cameron (2013; 2015), and 33 times by May (2017). Cameron 
has therefore considered the EU in his speeches more often, showing greater concern 
about the EU and its future, than Thatcher and later May. The usage of the word ‘global’ 
appeared most in May’s speech , 17 times (Ibid), considerably less in Cameron’s speeches 
(2013; 2015), 8 and 2 times respectively, and not at all in Thatcher’s speech (1988). This 
shows May focusing on Britain and its ties with the rest of the world to a greater extent 
than the other prime ministers. At the same time the word ‘Britain’ is used respectively 
16, 49, 71 and 90 (Thatcher, 1988; Cameron 2013; 2015; May, 2017) times by the prime 
ministers, complying with the previous analysis in that May, in comparison to others, has 
put the most emphasis in her rhetoric on Britain. Perhaps another factor showing the turn 
of the approaches towards being more Eurosceptical or showing greater commitment to 
the British nation is the geographical locations of where the speeches were held – increas-
ingly closer to the Buckingham Palace. Whether this is a conscious symbolic gesture or 
just a coincidence is unclear but a fact nonetheless. 
 
It could be said that principles, which were given by Thatcher (1988) and were meant to 
be guidance points for the future evolvement of the EC/EU, were ignored and done in-
versely, and therefore the British Euroscepticism was not diminished but became deeper. 
35 
 
This could be seen in Cameron’s emphasis on reforming the EU, the word ‘reform’ com-
ing up 11 times in his approach (Cameron, 2015), but only three times in rest of the 
speeches (Thatcher, 1988; May, 2017). Similarly, Cameron (2015) sees the ‘big prize’ 
being a new kind of EU, but May (2017) uses the words ‘big prize’ when referring to 
opportunities that lie ahead now that the UK has left the EU.  
 
In conclusion, to answer the research questions, based on the comparison of the speeches, 
it could be said that British Euroscepticism has been prevalent in British prime ministers’ 
narratives since Thatcher’s speech and it is not a new phenomenon; that the Euroscepti-
cism has changed in Britain, moving from nation- and policy-based soft Euroscepticism 
to reformist-attitudinal policy-based middle-ground Euroscepticism to hard Euroscepti-
cism reasoned on the basis of soft Eurosceptical elements. The hypothesis of the thesis – 
the British Euroscepticism having constantly evolved towards a harder approach, is there-
fore also confirmed. Thus it could be reasoned, that the evolvement of British Euroscep-
ticism is one of the factors that led the Brits to saying ‘yes’ to Brexit as the prime ministers 
– representatives of the British people – moved towards a harder approach, so did the 
public. 
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Table 1. Summary of comparisons between prime ministers 
 
 
Prime 
minister 
Factors of Euroscepticism 
 General Economy Geography-
psychology 
link 
History EU in 
miniature 
Rhetoric Media 
Thatcher 
(1988) 
Soft national- 
and policy-
based Euro-
scepticism 
Pro-Single 
Market, Brit-
ish economy 
tied to the 
EC, eco-
nomic re-
forms needed 
in the EC 
Mostly psy-
chological 
approach, 
folly to have 
a European 
identikit 
Strong 
moral supe-
riority from 
WWII, light 
legislative 
concerns 
In regard 
to the 
need of 
own 
power-
structures 
Colourful 
language, 
British ap-
proach to 
the EC’s 
operation, 
some re-
gard to 
frontiers 
Not 
used 
Cameron 
(2013; 
2015) 
Reformist-atti-
tudinal Euro-
scepticism 
Pro-Single 
Market, 
need for eco-
nomic re-
forms in the 
EU, opposi-
tion to the 
Eurozone 
Most men-
tions of the 
EU, the Brits 
are an island 
nation with 
its character-
istics  
Some moral 
superiority 
from WWII, 
some legis-
lative con-
cerns 
Topic of 
diversity 
in the UK 
British 
model of 
member-
ship of the 
EU, some 
exalting of 
the UK, 
topics of 
migration, 
climate 
Not 
used 
May 
(2017) 
Hard Euro-
scepticism 
based on fac-
tors of soft Eu-
roscepticism 
Focused on 
trade deals 
outside of the 
EU, opposi-
tion to the 
Single Mar-
ket 
‘Global Brit-
ain’, greatest 
focus on 
Britain as a 
separate en-
tity 
No moral 
superiority, 
wide legis-
lative con-
cerns 
Repeated 
use of the 
UK com-
prising of 
several 
nations 
rhetoric 
New part-
nership to 
the EU, ex-
alting the 
UK, topics 
of migra-
tion and 
terrorism 
Re-
garded 
briefly 
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SUMMARY 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the use of British Eurosceptical elements in 
British prime ministers’ approaches to the UK-EU relationship and offer a conceptual 
map of 30 years of Euroscepticism in Britain based on the comparison of Thatcher’s, 
Cameron’s and May’s speeches.  
 
A theoretical framework for both, general Euroscepticism and British Euroscepticism, 
was put together based on works of multiple authors and were used as backgrounds on 
which the analytical aspect of the thesis was conducted. Geographical-psychological 
links, history, media, rich rhetoric, being the EU in miniature, and economy were the 
elements looked for in analysing the British prime ministers’ approaches of British Euro-
scepticism. A distinction between hard and soft Euroscepticism was also used to give 
each prime minister a general standpoint in their approach towards the EU. 
 
An overall conclusion, following the results of the analysis and discussion, was that each 
prime minister used the factors of British Euroscepticism in their speeches, and even 
though there were similarities in the approaches, each of them had a different viewpoint 
on the UK-EU relationship. The analysis also showed that British Euroscepticism is not 
a new phenomenon but has been prevalent since Thatcher’s Bruges speech. Another con-
clusion was that as the approaches to the EU changed with the prime ministers, the Euro-
scepticism became more ingrained into their speeches, constituting a shift from 
Thatcher’s soft Euroscepticism to Cameron’s middle-ground Euroscepticism to May’s 
hard Euroscepticism. Therefore the hypothesis posted at the beginning of the thesis, that 
British Euroscepticism constantly evolved towards a harder approach was also proven. 
The reasoning that the evolvement of British Euroscepticism was a factor in saying ‘yes’ 
to Brexit was brought out as well. 
 
This work is meant to be an addition to the discourse on the UK-EU relationship and does 
not thus strive for being an all-inclusive research on the topic, but could be used as a basis 
for an argument in the field. Further research could follow several paths. Firstly, it would 
be possible to look for new elements of British Euroscepticism not used in the thesis and 
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widen the research in that way. Another approach for further studies would be to deepen 
the research by including multiple speeches from prime ministers or by constituting a 
continuous timeline of speeches of all British prime ministers from Thatcher onwards into 
the analysis to get a more specific and detailed account on the topic. It would also be 
useful to theorize a clearer distinction between hard and soft Euroscepticism as they get 
slightly muddled when applied to empirical material. At the same time, further research 
on how much, or if actually at all, the prime ministers’ evolving hard Euroscepticism 
influenced the British in saying ‘yes’ to Brexit, could be made as well. 
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THATCHERIST MAYNI: BRITI EUROSKEPTITSISMI ARENGU RAAMISTA-
MINE BREXITINI 
 
Eliise Merila  
 
Resümee 
 
Euroskeptitsism on laialdaselt uuritud valdkond, ning selle peamiseks näiteks on Suurb-
ritannia. Briti euroskeptitsism on väärt uurimist, kuna ükski teine Euroopa Liidu liige ei 
ole läbi viinud referendumeid liitu jäämise kohta, mis näitab briti inimeste kõrgemat eu-
roskeptitsismi taset ning sel põhjusel valiti ka antud uurimisteema. Uurimus on nii asja- 
kui ajakohane Brexiti referendumi tõttu selles mõttes, et kas euroskeptitsismi tase arenes 
järjepidevalt punktini, kus referendum läbiviimine oli vajalik, või tuli läbiviimise idee 
hiljuti.   
 
Käesoleva töö eesmärk oli analüüsida briti euroskeptiliste elementide kasutust Suurbri-
tannia peaministrite käsitlustes Euroopa Liidu (EL) ja Ühendkuningriikide (ÜK) vahelis-
tes suhetes, ning luua kontseptuaalne kaardistik 30 aastast briti euroskeptitsismist, võrrel-
des Thatcheri, Cameroni ja May avalikke kõnesid diskursuseanalüüsi meetodil.  
 
Loodi teoreetiline raamistik nii üldisele euroskeptitsismile kui ka briti euroskeptitsismile, 
mis põhinesid mitmete autorite töödele, ning neid raamistike kasutati alustena, millel teesi 
analüütiline pool läbi viidi. Briti peaministrite lähenemiste analüüsimises briti euroskep-
titsismile otsiti järgmiseid elemente: geograafilised-psühholoogilised seosed, ajalugu, 
meedia, rikkalik retoorika, nägemus Suurbritanniast kui miniatuursest EList, ning majan-
dus. Lisaks kasutati ’kõva’ ja ’pehme’ euroskeptitsismi eristamist, et anda igale peami-
nistrile üldine seisukoht oma ELi käsitluses. 
 
Analüüsi ja diskussiooni põhjal tehtud üleüldiseks järelduseks oli, et iga peaminister ka-
sutas oma kõnes briti euroskeptitsismi tegureid, ning kuigi nende käsitlustes leidus sar-
nasusi, oli igaühel neist erinev vaatepunkt ELi ja ÜK vahelisele suhtele. Analüüs näitas 
ka, et briti euroskeptitsism ei ole uus nähtus, vaid on olnud valdav alates Margaret 
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Thatcheri Brugge kõnest. Lisaks järeldati, et käsitlused EList muutusid iga peaministriga 
ning euroskeptitsism juurdus kõnedes järjest sügavamale, mis kujutab muutust Thatcheri 
pehmest euroskeptitsismist Cameroni kesktee euroskeptitsismini ning edasi May kõva 
euroskeptitsismini. Seega leidis töö alguses püstitatud hüpotees, et briti euroskeptitsism 
arenes pidevalt kõvema käsitluse poole, tõestust. Samuti toodi välja arutluskäik, et briti 
euroskeptitsismi areng oli üheks teguriks Brexitile ’jah’ ütlemises. 
 
Käesolev töö on mõeldud lisana ELi ja ÜK vahelise suhte diskursusesse ega taotle posit-
siooni selle teema kõikehõlmava uurimusena, kuid seda tööd on võimalik kasutada argu-
mentatsiooni alusena antud alal. Järgnevad uurimused võivad jaotuda mitmes suunas. 
Esiteks on võimalik uurida briti euroskeptitsismi uusi elemente, mida töös ei käsitleta, 
ning seekaudu uurimust laiendada. Üheks tulevase uurimise lähenemiseks võib olla uuri-
muse süvendamine, kui hõlmata analüüsi mitmeid peaministrite kõnesid või moodustada 
järjepidev ajaliin kõikide Suurbritannia peaministrite kõnedest alates Thatcherist, et saada 
teemast spetsiifilisem ja täpsem ülevaade. Lisaks oleks kasulik teoretiseerida selgema 
vahe üle kõva ja pehme euroskeptitsismi käsitlustes, kuna see piir kipub empiirilisel ma-
terjalil kasutades hägustuma. Samal ajal oleks võimalik läbi viia ka järgnev uurimus sel-
lest, kuidas, või kas üldse, mõjutas peaministrite kõva euroskeptitsismi areng britte Bre-
xitile ’jah’ ütlema. 
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